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This  amicus curiae brief is submitted by a group of 
economists in support of respondents Eleanor Heald et al. 
(cases 03-1116 and 03-1120). The individual signatories on this 
brief are leading economics scholars whose contributions to the 
study of consumer markets have enjoyed national and 
international recognition and acclaim.  
George A. Akerlof is Professor of Economics at the 
University of California at Berkeley and 2001 Nobel Laureate 
in Economics. 
Daniel L. McFadden is Professor of Economics at the 
University of California at Berkeley and 2000 Nobel Laureate 
in Economics.  
Vernon L. Smith is Professor of Economics at George Mason 
University and 2002 Nobel Laureate in Economics. 
Donald J. Boudreaux is Chairman of the Department of 
Economics at George Mason University.  
Robert W. Hahn is Executive Director of the AEI-Brookings 
Joint Center for Regulatory Studies. 
John M. Letiche is Emeritus Professor of Economics at the 
University of California at Berkeley.  
Robert E. Litan is Director of the AEI-Brookings Joint 
Center for Regulatory Studies. 
The economists were assembled by the Henry Wine Group, a 
for-profit corporation domiciled in California.
1  The Henry 
Wine Group is the largest importer, distributor, and broker in 
the United States dealing exclusively in fine wines. The firm’s 
business model, which emphasizes quality services to suppliers 
and customers, rests on the recognition that the special needs of 
                                                           
1   No party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person 
except amicus Henry Wine Group made a monetary contribution to the 
preparation and submission of this brief. See S. Ct. R. 37.6.   2
fine wine suppliers and their customers are not being met by the 
dominant, spirits-driven wholesale distributors. Protectionist 
state regulations constitute a significant obstacle to the Henry 
Wine Group’s growth and market penetration outside 
California.  
For many years, the company’s leading officers have played 
an active role in a national campaign against antiquated and 
inefficient wine marketing restrictions. In their experience, 
economic considerations and, in particular, the consumer 
benefits that would likely flow from a more open wine market 
have often received too little recognition in a debate where 
regulatory concerns, interest group politics, and weighty 
constitutional questions all intersect. Accordingly, the Henry 
Wine Group asked the signatories to provide a fuller picture of 
the wine market and its regulatory environment, which may be 
powerfully affected by these cases. We claim no constitutional 
expertise, and we submit this brief entirely in our capacity as 
economists and on the economic background and implications 
of the direct shipment regulations here at issue. All parties have 
consented to the filing of this brief. 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
Throughout the United States, wine is commonly sold under 
a “three-tier” system: producer to wholesaler to retailer. Most 
states prohibit vertical integration between the tiers, and most 
protect the three-tier system through a variety of regulatory 
means. Among the most common restrictions are limitations or 
outright bans on direct sales from producers to consumers.  
Direct shipping restrictions, and especially bans on direct 
interstate shipments, are measures of a type that quite likely 
would inflict welfare losses on consumers and on many wine 
producers, especially smaller market participants. If existing 
state restrictions on direct interstate shipments were removed,   3
there would be more competition, which would have a positive 
impact on consumer and social welfare (that is, the total surplus 
of consumers and producers).  
As we read the briefs submitted by the state parties and their 
amici in these cases, they do not seriously contest either the 
economic costs of the regulatory regime nor, by implication, 
the potential benefits of a national wine market that is free from 
protectionist inhibitions. Rather, they contend that the existing 
restrictions are justified by other state interests, such as the 
promotion of temperance, the protection of minors, tax 
collection considerations, and the maintenance of orderly 
market conditions. These concerns, however, cannot justify the 
discriminatory laws at issue in these cases. More broadly, the 
history and the contours of state restrictions on direct 
shipments, as well as the empirical evidence from state markets 
that lack those restrictions, indicate that the proffered public-
interest justifications are not persuasive. The available evidence 
supports the economists’ expectation that restrictions on market 
entry often serve to protect highly organized and entrenched 
interest groups, to the detriment of consumer welfare. 
To repeat, we neither possess nor claim expertise on the true 
scope of the Twenty-first Amendment. With that caveat, we 
argue that the principles of open state borders and non-
discrimination, as they have been explicated in this Court’s 
decisions under the Commerce Clause, are consistent with the 
economic profession’s well-accepted views on the benefits of 
free trade and competitive markets. Those views support the 
invalidation of the discriminatory state regulations at issue in 
these cases.  
 
I.  DIRECT SHIPPING RESTRICTIONS DIMINISH 
CONSUMER AND ECONOMIC WELFARE 
   4
The U.S. wine market has been subject to relatively little 
systematic empirical or econometric analysis. That is 
unfortunate (for the purposes of these cases) but hardly 
surprising. Some markets—such as network industries, natural 
monopolies, or industries with declining marginal costs—cause 
a great deal of disagreement among economists. The wine 
market, in contrast, is a classic, competitive market, albeit a 
heavily regulated one. The dynamics of such markets and the 
consequences of regulatory interventions have been well-
understood for many decades. The application of that expert 
consensus to the wine market and its regulatory context is 
straightforward. 
 
A.  State-Imposed Direct Shipping Restrictions 
Constitute a Significant Regulatory Barrier 
to an Efficient National Wine Market 
 
Over the past 25 years, the United States wine market has 
undergone dramatic changes at the production stage, in the 
distribution process, and at the demand level. The present 
market conditions, insofar as they pertain to state-imposed 
direct shipping restrictions, are summarized with admirable 
clarity in a study by the staff of the Federal Trade Commission. 
Report from the Staff of the Federal Trade Commission, 
Possible Anticompetitive Barriers to E-Commerce: Wine (July 
2003)  available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winreport2.pdf (hereinafter FTC 
Report). The fact that petitioners and their amici do not bother 
to discuss the findings of the FTC Report provides further 
evidence of the soundness of the FTC staff’s analysis. 
The wine industry has been characterized both by a 
remarkably high degree of market entry on the part of wineries 
and by increased concentration on the part of distributors. “[A]s 
demand has increased for individualistic, hand-crafted wines, 
the number of wineries has grown dramatically, from between   5
500–800 in 1975 to well over 2,000 today.” FTC Report at 6 
(footnote citing estimates omitted). At the same time, 
concentration in the market for mass-marketed wines has 
increased. Thirty U.S. wine companies supply over 90 percent 
of U.S. production, and the top three firms account for 60 
percent of volume. Gina M. Riekhof & Michael E. Sykuta, 
Politics, Economics, and the Regulation of Direct Interstate 
Shipping in the Wine Industry, CORI Working Paper 03-04 at 7 
(citing estimates and sources) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=481947 (hereinafter Riekhof & 
Sykuta). The distributor industry has experienced rapid 
concentration. Market participation has dropped from several 
thousand in the 1950s to a few hundred today. In some regions, 
the distributor market may be approaching near-monopolistic 
conditions, although systematic data appear to be unavailable. 
FTC Report at 6. 
Clearly, state regulatory interventions impede competition at 
the wholesale level. Many states have enacted laws that grant 
wholesalers preferential contract rights, establish exclusive 
territorial arrangements between wholesalers and wineries,
2 and 
deter price cutting. The FTC has been sharply critical of some 
of these measures and their anti-competitive effects. FTC 
Report at 6–7 (listing examples). There is also some evidence 
that market concentration has increased at the retail level. 
Riekhof & Sykuta at 9–10. 
At the consumer level, the demand for high-end wines—a 
luxury good—has increased with the general rise in prosperity. 
This group of consumers is largely composed of the wealthiest 
members of our society. The Wine Spectator—the most widely 
                                                           
2   Such arrangements are not necessarily anti-competitive. In some 
situations, they may well lower price and improve quality. However, in 
combination with other government interventions (such as laws that make it 
difficult for suppliers to terminate contracts with distributors), state-
protected exclusive territories tend to produce anti-competitive outcomes. 
Douglas Glen Whitman, Strange Brew: Alcohol and Government Monopoly 
27–28 (2003).   6
circulated magazine devoted exclusively to wines—counts 
upwards of 1.1 million readers, with a median household 
income of $144,500. Wine Spectator Advertising Information 3 
(2003)  available at 
http://www.winespectator.com/Wine/Images/Graphics/ads/WS
_NAT_EKIT.pdf (hereinafter Wine Spectator). This segment of 
the overall wine-consuming populace appears to have grown 
rapidly and substantially over the past decade. For example, the 
Wine Spectator’s paid circulation has increased from roughly 
150,000 in 1994 to nearly 375,000 in 2003. Wine Spectator at 
8. At the same time, the emergence of the Internet as a 
distribution channel has, in the states where direct purchases 
are permitted, substantially increased consumer access to rare 
high-end wines. Direct shipments are estimated at over $500 
million, or 3% of the wine market. FTC Report at 5 (citing 
estimates). 
In this changed market environment, the shrinking 
distributor network has resulted in a bottleneck. And market 
participants, not surprisingly, have attempted to bypass this 
bottleneck. Large wineries have created their own distribution 
systems, where that is permitted by law. Small wineries, for 
their part, have sought to avail themselves of direct-sales 
opportunities. Those firms, often producing no more than two 
or three-thousand cases per year, cannot supply the volume 
required for mass distribution. For distributors, carrying small-
volume wines entails high transaction costs. Distributors are 
typically responsible for promotional activities, such as wine 
tastings. Small-scale sales do not warrant such expenditures. As 
a result, “only the 50 to 100 largest wineries are able to secure 
widespread representation in distribution networks.” Alan E. 
Wiseman & Jerry Ellig, Market and Nonmarket Barriers to 
Internet Wine Sales: The Case of Virginia, 6:2 Business and 
Politics at 5 (2004) available at 
http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol6/iss2/art4 (hereinafter 
Virginia Study). Small wineries typically use direct shipments 
as their primary means of accessing the national market. E-  7
commerce has rendered such sales viable, but regulatory 
prohibitions on direct shipments in many states bar mutually 
beneficial transactions among small wineries and their 
consumers. 
We know of no systematic effort to quantify the welfare 
effects of the existing direct shipment restrictions. Highly 
illustrative evidence, however, comes from the Virginia Study, 
the only available empirical comparison of the online and off-
line wine markets. The study was conducted in 2002 in the area 
of McLean, Virginia, when Virginia administered a ban on 
direct interstate shipments (since lifted). The authors compared 
online prices and availability of 83 popular wines, identified 
through a poll that incorporates consumer preferences, with off-
line prices and availability in the McLean area. Availability 
was unambiguously higher online. Even among the most 
popular twenty wines, eight were unavailable in the McLean 
area. Price comparisons, predictably, varied greatly with 
purchase quantity, the price level of wines, and delivery method 
for online purchases. Since transportation costs do not change 
with the price of wine, and since transportation costs constitute 
a larger proportion of total cost for low-volume shipments, 
online purchases are not a winning proposition for the 
connoisseur’s sampling purposes (let alone a teenager’s instant 
gratification). Unsurprisingly, though, the Virginia Study found 
substantial price advantages for online, by-the-case purchases 
of high-end wines. Direct shipment, in other words, generates 
economic benefits for the customer base that matches the Wine 
Spectator’s readership, more than two-thirds of which report 
by-the-case wine purchases. Wine Spectator at 6. 
The magnitude of the welfare losses that attend to direct 
shipping restrictions cannot be estimated with any confidence. 
Virginia Study at 20 n.38 (noting that a comprehensive welfare 
analysis would require additional, currently unavailable data). 
It is clear, however, that there exists a robust demand for online 
wine purchases and a producer and distribution base to serve   8
that demand. One cannot reasonably contest the FTC staff’s 
conclusion that “[s]tate bans on interstate direct shipping of 
wine represent the single largest regulatory barrier to expanded 
e-commerce in wine.” FTC Report at 3.   
 
B.  The Demise of Direct Shipping Restrictions 
Would Yield Economic Benefits  
 
These cases do not challenge direct shipping restrictions per 
se. They challenge only discriminatory barriers to direct wine 
shipments. If those barriers were invalidated (as we urge the 
Court to do), Michigan and other states would remain free to 
erect those same barriers on a non-discriminatory basis. 
Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 518–519 (4
th Cir. 2003). That 
lawful policy choice, however, would be bad economic policy. 
The petitioners and their amici defend direct shipment 
restrictions on wine as an urgent exercise of the states’ police 
powers and their interests in encouraging temperance, fighting 
teenage drinking, and ensuring tax collection. We do not 
dispute the legitimacy of those objectives. As economists, 
however, we are trained to demand evidence, and, moreover to 
weigh all of the costs and benefits of a particular public policy. 
On  both counts, the petitioners’ policy positions and assertions 
are unpersuasive. 
The FTC Report provides no reason to believe that the 
demise of direct shipping restrictions would lead to the dire 
consequences predicted by the petitioners and their amici. The 
FTC staff conducted an extensive review of the experience in 
states that already permit direct interstate shipment of wine. 
Surveyed state officials reported “that they have experienced 
few, if any, problems with interstate direct shipment of wine to 
minors.” FTC Report at 31. That observation is consistent with 
the economic evidence that Internet purchases of wine are an 
uneconomical and therefore unlikely proposition for teenagers.   9
Similarly, many states have adopted less restrictive means than 
an outright prohibition on direct interstate shipments, and those 
states report “few, if any” problems with tax collection. Id. at 
38. The permit systems administered by many states appear to 
be a viable means of ensuring tax collection. Id. at 38–40. In 
that light, it is not surprising that the great majority of lower 
courts have concluded that states have less restrictive means 
than a ban on direct interstate shipments to enforce legitimate 
state objectives. Id. at 27–29 (summarizing cases). 
Similarly, the state’s amici have warned that the invalidation 
of Michigan’s laws would spell the collapse of the three-tier 
system not only for wine but also for beer and liquor. See, e.g., 
Brief of National Beer Wholesalers Association in Support of 
Petitioners at 4 (Sixth Circuit decision in this case “toppled a 
comprehensive three-tier system governing the distribution of 
intoxicating liquor”). That contention grossly exaggerates the 
likely consequences on the distribution system and, moreover, 
ignores the economic benefits of broader market access. The 
invalidation of direct shipping restrictions would favorably 
affect the availability and, most likely, the price of many wines. 
Both effects would enhance consumer welfare. The likely 
effects on industry structure and in particular the three-tier 
system are indeterminate, as they will depend on market 
participants’ responses and on regulatory interventions. The 
most likely effect, however, is a more efficient distribution 
system.  
 
      (i)  Availability. A key effect of direct shipping 
restrictions is not to reduce the aggregate supply of 
wine (adults can buy all the wine they want) but 
rather to compress the range of choice. Inventory 
costs and diseconomies of scale prevent 
wholesalers and retailers from offering anything 
remotely comparable to the breadth of choice of 
wines and vintages offered by producers. Due to   10
economic necessity, the distribution network limits 
the choice to a relative handful of well-known 
brands. A reasonable estimate of the welfare losses 
associated with the unavailability of many wines 
would require systematic information on 
elasticities and product substitution in this market. 
We do not possess such information. Elementary 
economic reasoning and casual empirical 
information, however, suggest that those losses 
very likely could be significant. 
  As noted earlier, the principal purchasers of direct 
shipment are frequent consumers of high-end 
wines, who purchase the goods for future rather 
than immediate consumption. The revealed 
preferences of these consumers indicate that they 
view limited selection as anything but trivial. They 
would not subscribe to expensive magazines, let 
alone devote time to reading them, if they were 
indifferent between one Chardonnay and the next. 
Wholly apart from price effects and even quality, 
supply diversification itself has sizeable benefits 
for consumers who want to stock a respectable 
wine cellar (much as liquid and diversified equity 
markets benefit financial investors). Moreover, 
these consumers confront very high opportunity 
costs in the form of lost income or foregone leisure 
time. These costs mount as consumers spend time 
in traffic on the way to distant specialty retail 
stores, instead of selecting and purchasing wines—
from a much greater variety—on the Internet. 
Needless to say, nothing in economic theory 
commands special preference for rich, time-pressed 
consumers. But nothing, either, warrants a 
dismissal of the welfare losses that occur as a result 
of anti-competitive regulation whose effects are 
especially felt in this segment of the populace.     11
  The demise of direct shipping regulations would 
necessarily expand selection and availability, as no 
regional retail market (let alone an individual 
retailer) can possibly offer the variety that is 
available on the Internet. However, market 
participants will not remain idle when confronted 
with increased competition. Broader availability of 
wines through direct shipping will likely increase 
selection at the retail level (certainly among local 
specialty retailers, if not necessarily within 
individual sales locations). Retail demand, in turn, 
may well prompt efforts at the distributor level to 
supply a greater variety of wines. 
   
(ii) Price. While the likely price effects of a demise 
of direct shipping restrictions for wine are more 
conjectural than the predictable and 
unambiguously salutary effects on selection, 
general economic evidence strongly suggests that 
the elimination of artificial barriers to market entry 
should reduce prices. Economic models show 
conflicting results with respect to the price effects 
of Internet sales. Virginia Study at 9–11; FTC 
Report at 16–17 and sources cited id. n.75. The 
Virginia Study, as noted, showed substantial price 
advantages for by-the-case purchases of high-end 
wines over the Internet. As the authors observe, the 
static design of that study—conducted in a 
jurisdiction where direct shipments were prohibited 
at the time—permits no inference concerning the 
price effects (let alone the welfare effects) under 
competitive conditions. Virginia Study at 29. Still, 
the evidence of that study is consistent with the 
economists’ ordinary expectations about the price 
effects of broader competition: prices should 
generally drop, though not necessarily for all   12
wines. That expectation is further buttressed by 
considerations of political economy, more fully 
discussed below. The fact that the three-tier system 
enjoys government protection in many states 
suggests that those protections generate surplus 
profits, which are likely to accrue to distributors in 
the form of economic rents and to consumers in the 
form of higher prices. The demise of direct 
shipping prohibitions would—in the absence of 
other government barriers to broader market 
entry—erode those rents and redound to 
consumers’ benefit. FTC Report at 23.    
 
(iii) Market Structure. The state defendants and 
their  amici in these cases—in particular, 
wholesalers—have intimated that the invalidation 
of discriminatory direct shipping regulations would 
spell the demise of the three-tiered system. Brief 
for the Wine and Spirits Wholesalers of America in 
Support of Petitioners at 4, 24. In contrast, those 
same interests have described the existing, 
mandatory three-tier system as efficient. C. Boyden 
Gray, Written Statement on Behalf of Wine and 
Spirits Wholesalers of America at 2 (2002) 
available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommerce/anticompetitiv
e/panel/gray.pdf.; FTC Report at 22 (citing 
additional sources). These positions are 
inconsistent.  
A three-tier market structure is efficient in many 
settings. That is why it exists in many unregulated 
commodity markets, and why it continues to exist 
with respect to wine sales in states that do not 
mandate a three-tier structure (such as California) 
or that permit direct sales subject to some   13
restrictions (such as Illinois). Daniel L. McFadden, 
Interstate Wine Shipments and E-Commerce at 3 
(2002)  available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommerce/anticompetitiv
e/panels/mcfadden.pdf (hereinafter McFadden). 
Specialization, efficiencies of scale, and other 
considerations often justify “middlemen” and their 
mark-ups.  
What is at stake, however, is not the three-tiered 
system per se but rather the governmental 
imposition and protection of that system. The fact 
that many wine market participants have attempted 
to bypass the distributor bottleneck at both ends 
shows that a three-tiered system—especially where 
it is artificially imposed—is inefficient for those 
firms. For example, Australia’s Foster’s Brewing 
Company in 2001 acquired Beringer’s, a large 
California winery, to leverage Beringer’s 
distribution system for Foster’s U.S. market 
expansion. Other market participants, including 
amicus Henry Wine Group, have consolidated 
portfolios of smaller wineries to build distribution 
capacity. Such vertical integration and acquisitions 
indicate that the costs of equivalent market access 
through arms-length market transactions must be 
quite high. Riekhof & Sykuta at 10; Ronald H. 
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 
(1937). Similarly, small wineries, in concert with 
consumer groups and non-profit law firms, have 
waged a long and determined campaign against 
wine marketing restrictions. Such investments 
suggest that the gains from reducing barriers to 
entry very likely could be sizable. 
No one can confidently predict the market structure 
consequences of deregulating the wine market—  14
any more than the economists who predicted 
substantial consumer gains from airline 
deregulation could predict the market structure that 
would emerge (see, e.g., Michael E. Levine, Is 
Regulation Necessary? California Air 
Transportation and National Regulatory Policy, 74 
Yale L. J. 1416 (1965)). For reasons mentioned, 
however, the demise of state protections of the 
three-tiered system will very likely generate 
greater diversity of distribution arrangements. A 
three-tiered system would survive where it 
generates efficiencies and suffer profit erosion 
where it fails to adjust to changed market 
conditions.  
Such erosion of profits, however, by no means 
spells the demise of a three-tiered system. Amicus 
Daniel L. McFadden, one of the nation’s leading 
experts on consumer markets (and an owner of a 
small winery), has argued that the distributors’ 
investments in protecting their turf are 
disproportionate to the consumer benefits that 
would flow from a demise of artificial government 
protections of a three-tiered system. One reason 
why that might be so is that the broader availability 
of individualistic wines would tend to sharpen 
consumer awareness and appreciation. McFadden 
at 3.  This analysis is consistent with the prediction 
that the demise of direct shipping restrictions will 
principally affect the selection rather than the price 
of wines. Put differently, expanding markets are 
not a zero-sum game.  
One likely and salutary effect would occur 
“upstream,” in wine production. Since one does not 
normally observe rapid market entry and increased 
market concentration at the same time, one can 
infer that the existing distribution bottleneck   15
substantially contributes to the bifurcation of the 
market into large and increasingly concentrated 
producers at one end and small wineries that cater 
to tourists and Internet purchasers at the other end. 
Dale M. & Philip L. Martin, Inside the Bottle: The 
Wine Business, Choices 30, 33 (Fall 2002). A more 
flexible distribution system would likely contribute 
to a market structure that more accurately reflects 
market forces and efficiencies. 
    
II.   DISCRIMINATORY DIRECT SHIPPING 
RESTRICTIONS ERECT PROTECTIONIST 
BARRIERS THAT LACK A PLAUSIBLE 
JUSTIFICATION 
 
A.  The Nondiscrimination Principle of the 
dormant Commerce Clause Serves 
Compelling Economic Purposes 
 
As noted, the petitioners and their amici fail to cite (let alone 
rebut) the FTC Report’s finding that states have many less 
restrictive means than a direct shipment prohibition (especially 
a discriminatory prohibition) to protect legitimate tax and 
public health interests. Perhaps in recognition of the weakness 
of their position, several briefs on behalf of the petitioners 
argue for an overruling of Supreme Court precedents that 
require a tight means-ends relationship with respect to 
discriminatory state laws. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners 28 
(“Michigan respectfully submits that Bacchus was wrongly 
decided…”); Brief of Ohio and 32 Other States as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Petitioners 10–12 (“Bacchus was wrongly 
decided and should  be overruled.”); Brief of National Beer 
Wholesalers Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners 15 n.10 (“Bacchus should at the least be confined to 
its unique facts and procedural history.”). That extreme position   16
should be rejected. The nondiscrimination principle of the 
dormant Commerce Clause serves compelling economic 
interests that would otherwise be unprotected.     
To be sure, economic rents tend to dissipate, and there are 
reasons to believe that this is already happening in the wine 
distribution market. McFadden at 3. The relevant consideration, 
however, is the time horizon. One can argue, for example, that 
monopolies will inevitably disappear over time and that the 
only function of antitrust law is to shorten the time frame over 
which that result will occur. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits 
of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1984). But while that 
consideration counsels caution in extending legal norms to 
poorly understood contexts, the game is plainly worth the 
candle when we can be sure about the results of applying the 
basic rules to the easy cases. These cases, as explained to us, do 
not call for an extension of the dormant Commerce Clause; they 
confront the hard core of that doctrine with an openly 
discriminatory state violation. Reliance on long-term economic 
forces is no reason to repeal Section 1 of the Sherman Act or to 
suspend the operation of the dormant Commerce Clause in a 
paradigmatic discrimination case. 
Nor is there any comfort in the observation that the costs of 
state prohibitions of direct wine shipments will in all events be 
paid by regulating states’ own citizens. The ready answer is that 
this Court has steadfastly rejected, in cases involving 
discriminatory state regulation, the argument that the in-state 
incidence of the costs somehow exempt a discriminatory 
regime from Commerce Clause condemnation. West Lynn 
Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 203 (1994); Bacchus 
Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271–73 (1984). For one 
thing, there are two sides to every interstate transaction, and the 
dormant Commerce Clause protects the out-of-state seller at 
least to the same extent as the in-state consumer. H.P. Hood & 
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949). See also 
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 267 (1984) (out-  17
of-state wholesalers have standing to challenge discriminatory 
tax exemption for in-state producers). For another thing, the 
incidence of a discriminatory tax or regulation does not 
necessarily match its form or stated range of application. This 
implies that from a strictly economic perspective, a formal 
nondiscrimination principle will be both under- and over-
inclusive. However, economists agree that incidence analysis is 
a devilishly difficult and uncertain business for which courts 
are poorly equipped. Stephen F. Williams, Severance Taxes and 
Federalism: The Role of the Supreme Court in Preserving a 
National Common Market for Energy Supplies, 53 Colo. L. 
Rev. 281, 290–95 (1982). The true test of an efficient legal rule 
is not to get every case right but to reduce error costs in the 
general run of cases. The Court’s nondiscrimination rule, which 
condemns discriminatory state laws irrespective of their 
economic incidence, satisfies that criterion.     
 
B.  Direct Shipping Restrictions Owe Their 
Continued Existence to Protectionist 
Interest Group Pressures Rather Than 
Considerations of Consumer Welfare 
 
The three-tier system was constructed in the wake of the 
Twenty-first Amendment. Its principal purpose was to preclude 
the re-emergence of a “tied” system between producers and 
exclusive retailers. That system, it was widely believed, had 
before Prohibition induced excessive alcohol consumption and 
enabled organized crime to gain influence over alcohol 
distribution and sales. Even the best-constructed and most 
public-spirited regulatory system, however, may outlive its 
usefulness (for example, on account of technological change in 
the regulated industries) and, moreover, mutate into a means of 
protecting private rather than public interests. Sam Peltzman, 
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & Econ. 
211 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic   18
Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. 335 (1974); George Stigler, The 
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. 3 (1971).  
In the decades following the enactment of the Twenty-First 
Amendment, virtually all states adopted a three-tier system. 
Most states enacted direct shipment prohibitions to protect that 
system, but those restrictions played only a small role, as the 
technologies of those times rendered remote transactions 
between producers and consumers uneconomic. In 1986, 
however, California limited direct shipment to imports from 
states that would permit, on a reciprocal basis, the direct 
shipment of California wines to their citizen-consumers. The 
economic logic is not hard to fathom: by limiting direct 
shipment rights to reciprocity states, California—home to the 
nation’s largest wine industry—sought to open other states’ 
markets to its domestic producers.  
California’s move prompted a change from a relatively 
homogeneous state regulatory environment to the current 
patchwork of state alcohol regulation. Some states responded 
relatively quickly in the manner hoped for by California; there 
are now 13 reciprocity states. Many other states loosened their 
restrictions and allowed direct shipments from out-of-state, 
often under a permit system. A few states, however, Michigan 
among them, tightened their direct shipment regulations. 
The fierce contention over direct interstate shipments, which 
has at last reached this Court, is driven by interest groups. On 
one side are wine consumers, allied with small wineries that 
seek to satisfy consumer demand for small-volume, high-end 
wines but are inhibited in that endeavor by the existing 
distribution system. (Large wineries, which fare perfectly well 
under the existing distribution system and some of which have 
succeeded in establishing their own national distribution 
networks, are sitting on the sidelines.) On the other side stands 
an unusual coalition. Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists: 
The Education of a Regulatory Economist, Regulation 12 
(May/June 1983). The wholesalers of alcoholic beverages have   19
emerged as the nation’s staunchest and most resourceful 
advocates of temperance. More traditional temperance forces, 
for their part, have complemented their moral arguments with a 
rigorous defense of the regulatory bottleneck and to that end 
joined forces with the alcohol wholesalers. This unlikely 
coalition enjoys the support of public sector interests—that is, 
state regulators and tax administrators. 
These interest group alignments permit inferences both with 
respect to marketplace economics and with respect to the 
credibility of public-interest rationales to suppress competition. 
The interests that advocate a repeal of restrictions of direct 
interstate wine shipping (whether by legislative means or as a 
constitutional proposition) are by and large open about their 
economic self-interest, but they can buttress their position with 
arguments of consumer welfare. In contrast, the defenders of 
the existing distribution system have failed to defend their 
position on economic grounds, because no such grounds exist. 
They have instead relied on purported public interest rationales 
other than consumer welfare, some of which are diametrically 
opposed to their manifest economic interests. 
The variegated state responses to California’s unilateral 
adoption of a reciprocity regime in 1986 suggest an obvious 
question: why did formerly homogenous state regulatory 
regimes generate such disparate responses? Riekhof’s and 
Sykuta’s sophisticated analysis directly addresses that question 
and finds “that economic interests play a significant role in 
determining a state’s adoption of direct shipment [regulations], 
but no evidence supporting a general public interest 
motivation.” Riekhof & Sykuta at 4. That finding is highly 
plausible even at an intuitive level: “If direct shipment 
prohibitions prior to 1986 were in place solely for public 
interest reasons, it would be difficult to explain why 
California’s decision to adopt reciprocity would have its 
intended effect of opening up access to no-shipment states.” Id. 
at 12. Unsurprisingly, the authors find that the size of a state’s   20
wine industry (number of wineries relative to state wine 
consumption) is positively related to the adoption of reciprocity 
laws. Conversely, the size and concentration of the distributor 
industry are negatively correlated with the likelihood that 
reciprocity legislation will be enacted.  Id. at 22. Riekhof & 
Sykuta found that public sector interests (such as tax 
collections) also affect state responses. In contrast, none of the 
authors’ proxies for public interest considerations appeared to 
have a significant effect on state policy responses. Id. These 
results are highly consistent with well-accepted general 
economic theories of regulation. They directly affect the 
present case: “To the extent that public welfare interests are 
required by courts to justify states’ restrictions on interstate 
commerce, our results cast a shadow of doubt on public interest 
arguments in the area of direct shipment of wine.” Id. at 26. 
 
C.  The Constitutional Principle of Non-
Discrimination, as Applied by This Court, 
is Supported by Sound Economic 
Reasoning 
 
Every federal system (loosely speaking) confronts the 
challenge of reconciling open borders—a minimum condition 
of an integrated national market—with the preservation of the 
member-states’ legitimate regulatory powers. A number of 
principles answer to the task—none of them perfectly, but some 
well enough. See generally Michael Trebilcock & Robert 
Howse,  A Cautious View of International Harmonization: 
Implications from Breton’s Theory of Competitive 
Governments,  in Competition & Structure: The Political 
Economy of Collective Decisions 386 (Gianluigi Galeotti, 
Pierre Salmon, & Ronald Wintrobe eds., 2000). 
As has been pointed out, the governing principle should be 
stated explicitly in the federal system’s general charter. See 
Antonin Scalia, Chapter 16 in Federalism in a Changing   21
World: Learning from Each Other 539 (Raoul Blindenbacher & 
Arnold Koller eds., 2003) (explaining the advantages of the 
nondiscrimination rule for a European audience). But the need 
for a harmonizing principle is so strong that courts have felt 
compelled to infer it even where the governing instruments do 
not literally provide for it. The European Court of Justice, for 
example, has inferred from the European Treaties a principle of 
“mutual recognition,” which (in the absence of countervailing 
regulations by the European Commission) compels member-
states to open their markets to other EU countries’ goods so 
long as those goods conform to the regulatory requirements of 
the origin state (rather than the destination state). Rewe 
Zentrale v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis 
de Dijon), 120/78 [1979] ECR 649, [1979] 3 CMLR 494. This 
principle directly bars member-state regulations that 
discriminate against other member-countries’ producers. It is 
enforced in part through a demanding “least restrictive means” 
test, which compels member-states to pursue regulatory 
objectives that have discriminatory effects by means that 
minimize those effects. Commission v. Germany, 178/84 [1987] 
ECR 1227, [1988] 1 CMLR 780; Walter Rau v. de Smedt, 
261/81 [1982] ECR 3961, [1983] 2 CMLR 496. 
A principal alternative—more respectful of state regulatory 
authority than mutual recognition—is the principle of 
nondiscrimination. As explained to us, this principle is 
embodied in this Court’s decisions under the dormant 
Commerce Clause. Viewed through economists’ eyes, this 
principle appears to serve important economic functions. First, 
it obviously represents a middle path between forced exclusion 
(which could Balkanize the economy) and forced entry by 
outsiders (which would eviscerate the states’ police powers). 
Second, the principle serves as a vital safeguard against 
“naked” interest group transfers (or, as the Founders called it, 
“partial legislation”) that serve no public purpose but merely 
transfer wealth—typically, from unorganized constituencies 
(such as consumers) to highly organized interests (such as   22
liquor distributors). The presumption against such transfers 
pervades the entire Constitution. Cass Sunstein, Naked 
Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689 
(1984). 
A non-discrimination principle in interstate commerce 
provides no protection against purely in-state exploitation. But 
it need not do so: the principal protections come from the fact 
that citizens vote, both at the ballot box and with their feet (that 
is, by leaving states that give too wide a berth to interest group 
exploitation). Precisely for fear of those consequences, state-
level factions will seek to impose the costs of their schemes on 
outsiders, by regulating on an extra-territorial basis or by 
enacting schemes that exempt in-state interests from 
burdensome tax or regulatory schemes. The dormant 
Commerce Clause rightly prohibits both stratagems. See, 
respectively, Healy v. The Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989); 
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984). In that 
fashion, the non-discrimination rule curbs the destructive force 
of faction on the decisive margin. See generally Saul Levmore, 
Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 Va. L. 
Rev. 563 (1983) (arguing that the Supreme Court has employed 
the dormant Commerce Clause, and should continue to employ 
it, as a means of preventing interstate exploitation). 
These elementary considerations apply with full force to the 
present context. Michigan may permit direct wine shipments 
(even while prohibiting direct shipments of liquor or beer), or it 
may prohibit such shipments for all market participants, in-state 
and out-of-state. What the state may not do, barring the 
strongest possible justification, is to discriminate against out-
of-state parties. The economic justification for that rule, to 
repeat, is that such discrimination is a highly reliable signal for 
illicit interest group transfers. If a state is unwilling to impose 
the costs of some regulatory scheme on in-state producers (on a 
proportional basis), its proffered public interest rationales for 
the regulation are likely a pretext for redistribution. That   23
presumption may be overcome only by an exceedingly 
persuasive showing that the geographic discrimination in fact 
corresponds to a pressing public purpose. Maine v. Taylor, 477 
U.S. 131 (1986). Put differently, the nondiscrimination rule of 
the dormant Commerce Clause holds in-state interests hostage 
to the purpose of distinguishing bona fide public purposes from 
naked interest group transfers. While the burdened interest in a 
particular state will resent that fact in any given case, the rule 
works with perfect symmetry: the injunction against home-state 
preferences is the flipside of the more important right of 
nondiscriminatory access to other states’ markets. Economic 
actors unaware of which economic position they would assume 
after a random assignment would therefore, if rational, choose a 
non-discrimination rule that limits opportunities for 
exploitation on all sides. See generally, Geoffrey Brennan & 
James M. Buchanan, The Power to Tax (1980). Accordingly, 
there is no obvious economic reason for recognizing 
opportunistic preferences in favor of discrimination adopted 
after the fact.  
 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Sixth Circuit 
should be affirmed. 
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